**DYNAMICS OF TRADE PATTERN OF INDIA & US IN CONTEXT OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES SINCE 1991**

**ABSTRACT:**

In this research work, Author focuses on the analysis current trends in foreign trade theory and policy. Accordance to the foreign trade policy theory further trade liberalisation and improved framework policies would increase trade and promote growth. It must be emphasized that openess to trade is associated with higher incomes and growth and there are the need for new approaches to trade cooperation in light of the forces that are currently re-shaping international business. What indicates the importance and innovativeness of the research is the presentation of the new models of the foreign trade policy and trade interests. First of all it must underline that in the new theoretical terms in the demand for trade policy very important is factor specificity.

Foreign Policy decision-making is agreed to be one of the greatest instrument at a state’s disposal to pursue its national interests. It is considered as a full political activity of states. A good Foreign Policy would obviously lead a state in fulfilling its national interests and acquiring rightful place among comity of nations. As such the study of Foreign Policy forms an important part of International Studies. The United States has completed numerous free trade agreements, but the pattern of these agreements defies conventional explanations. Arguments that are based on domestic interests and economic gains cannot explain the comparative under-performance of American trade agreements. The pattern of American trade agreements is also inconsistent with explanations that focus on state power, by for instance depicting FTAs as a “reward” for loyal clients. This article finds a better explanation for the pattern of America’s FTAs by considering the systemic level of analysis, and in particular the dynamics of the international economic order. It illustrates that strong competition for bilateral trade agreements has resulted in patterns of agreements that the US cannot easily dominate. This is not to say that the US has no capacity to finalise trade agreements: the US remains the world’s most influential nation–state, but the constraints of the international system necessarily limit the degree to which FTAs can serve the interests of American foreign economy policy. The recent evolution of international trade politics, however, indicate that smaller states are comparatively less vulnerable to pressure from great powers such as the US.

Keywords: Foreign policy; India, United States, free trade agreements , national interests, international trade politics.

**INTRODUCTION**

India's image in the Western world has changed dramatically in the last decade. As a result of growing economic growth, strong integration with global market economies, faster spending, the successful launch of new communications technologies and the introduction of nuclear weapons and the strength of national defense strategies, India's image has changed. Suddenly, India is ‘everywhere’; but how far does it go in terms of foreign policy? A closer examination reveals that there has been a deep contradiction with what is not within his foreign policy, creating a sense of inconsistency and inconsistency with India’s intentions, as well as possible responses, on issues affecting his key interests. A certain degree of ambiguity and subsequent uncertainty arising from internal opposition is not uncommon in many democratic countries. This is evident when one analyzes other important concerns of India’s foreign policy, such as nuclearisation, Kashmir, terrorism and the Indian state in South Asia. India, however, seems to be a different story, especially considering India's policy of uncertainty over its power.

Has India's foreign policy been suspended, acting as Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, acting as its international security guard, and a single Quixotic hero, who wants to create a world without political power, despite having the latest nuclear weapon? Or did the nuclear tests of May 11 and 13, 1998, have no explicit desire to use nuclear weapons, just a gambling habit of setting foot in the door of a nuclear club (without appearing to do so)? In other words, was India 'playing poker', or was it a moral and ethical term?

While India's powerful political system has succeeded in bringing the 'noise' of Indian democracy to the world - such as the US or UK civil war over Iraq-sponsored policy in Iraq - but, there has been no depth, or remnants of national consensus based on interests. national. As such, while India joins a major democracy like the US or UK through domestic disputes and national policy, in contrast to them, the potential response in India on this issue remains uncertain, and the US or British response is equally predicted by foreigners. Gandhian’s legacy, the desire for the halcyon days of Nehru’s panash and and, above all, the political anchor of foreign policy on the great work of nation-building, explains the ambiguity that arises in India’s foreign policy. Obviously, this is a valid doctrine, even if it is not really the case. However, a closer look at global reality reveals a clear, effective and determined action that carries the threat of coherent doctrine, on the ‘third’ path of international politics, as it differs from American and European positions[[1]](#footnote-2).

**FOREIGN TRADE IN INDIA**

The land redistribution program, which began in the early 1980s, has seen a rapid increase in the process of economic integration and international trade volume, which has tripled in recent decades (UNCTAD, 2005). The least developed countries (LDCs) have played a major role in increasing world trade and, in fact, open trade has been a key factor in their growth plans.

In this context, India had just begun the period of trade expansion, as its opening of world trade began only after the crisis in 1991. However, the Indian economy had experienced rapid growth in the 1980s, as demonstrated by DeLong (2004), Panagariya (2004), and Rodrik and Subramanian (2004). The opening up of international trade should be seen as an integral part of the new economic policy, and as an integral part of the transformation agenda.

In this regard, the year 1991 marked the beginning of the overthrow of the Indian government in the 1980's and the widespread market regulation of the 1990's (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004; Kohli, 2006a, b). The previous approach was to increase productivity and profitability of existing industrial and commercial facilities. The aim was to grow producers and small businesses, protect them from overseas competition and promote local development and the creation of new ones. This strategy, originally developed by Indira Gandhi and used by Rajiv Gandhi during the second half of the 1980's, it depends on the reduction of the complex system of licenses required for production, and, in particular, those for investment and product classification. These plans were targeted at large firms, as they ensured the reduction of the 1985 limit contained in the Corporate Governance and Conduct Act (MRTP). Rajiv Gandhi's government has also introduced certain foreign exchange methods, for example the expansion of Open General Licensing (OGL), which includes a list of goods that do not require a foreign trade license[[2]](#footnote-3). The number of government regulators included has decreased (so-called 'canal' imports) and fewer incentives have been received. In addition, the rupee has found a real decline of about 30 percent. It is important to note that these measures were aimed primarily at medium and large assets. Consumer goods remain highly protected throughout the decade. A notable exception is the field of medical and pharmaceutical products that should grow rapidly over the next decade.

**THE PRESENT STATE OF INDIA’S FOREIGN TRADE POLICY**

The Indian Foreign Trade (FTP) policy contains schemes to support the exporting community. This includes development policies that help establish special trade and economic zones in different parts of the country.

On March 14, 2018, the US filed a complaint with the WTO alleging that India had violated its WTO obligations by maintaining export promotion schemes that were inconsistent with WTO rules prohibiting export subsidies. The legal basis for this challenge is the provisions under the WTO Convention on Grants and Counseling (SCM Agreement), co-management grants, including exports. The WTO panel set up to investigate complaints, in a report released on 31 October 2019, has concluded that certain benefits from export promotion programs being sent to India violate India's obligations not to provide foreign aid.

This decision could have a profound effect on Indian businesses. Strategies under this challenge have historically supported Indian exports and provided funding to reduce export costs and, as a result, have helped to develop export strategies such as exploring new markets. The broader context of the larger economy in which this challenge is implemented is equally important. Ongoing trade wars between US-China, Europe, etc. They are already creating business instability around the world, including in India. Moreover, the life span of the Indian manufacturing sector is very short. India's economy has seen a decline in the last few years due to exchanges and infrastructure. Given this domain, important exports such as automotive, pharmaceuticals, technology and IT, as well as textiles and clothing, are likely to be significantly affected[[3]](#footnote-4).

**FOREIGN TRADE IN US**

The **foreign policy of the United States** is its interactions with foreign nations and how it sets standards of interaction for its organizations, corporations and system citizens of the [United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States).

The officially stated goals of the foreign policy of the United States of America, including all the Bureaus and Offices in the [United States Department of State](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_State), as mentioned in the *Foreign Policy Agenda* of the Department of State, are "to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community". In addition, the [United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_Committee_on_Foreign_Affairs) states as some of its jurisdictional goals: "export controls, including nonproliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear hardware; measures to foster commercial interaction with foreign nations and to safeguard American business abroad; international commodity agreements; international education; and protection of American citizens abroad and expatriation". U.S. foreign policy and [foreign aid](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_United_States#Foreign_aid) have been the subject of much debate, praise and [criticism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_the_United_States#Criticism), both domestically and abroad.

The main trend regarding the history of U.S. foreign policy since the American Revolution is the shift from [non-interventionism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-interventionism) before and after [World War I](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I), to its growth as a world power and global [hegemony](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemony) during and since World War II and the end of the [Cold War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War) in the 20th century. Since the 19th century, U.S. foreign policy also has been characterized by a shift from the [realist school](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_realism) to the idealistic or [Wilsonian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilsonian) school of international relations.

Foreign policy themes were expressed considerably in [George Washington](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington)'s [farewell address](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington%27s_Farewell_Address); these included, among other things, observing good faith and justice towards all nations and cultivating peace and harmony with all, excluding both "inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others", "steer[ing] clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world", and advocating trade with all nations. These policies became the basis of the [Federalist Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalist_Party) in the 1790s, but the rival Jeffersonians feared Britain and favored France in the 1790s, declaring the [War of 1812](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_1812) on Britain. After the 1778 alliance with France, the U.S. did not sign another permanent treaty until the [North Atlantic Treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Atlantic_Treaty) in 1949. Over time, other themes, key goals, attitudes, or stances have been variously expressed by [Presidential 'doctrines'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Presidential_doctrines), named for them. Initially these were uncommon events, but since WWII, these have been made by most presidents.

Jeffersonians vigorously opposed a large standing army and any navy until attacks against American shipping by [Barbary corsairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barbary_corsairs) spurred the country into developing a naval force projection capability, resulting in the [First Barbary War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Barbary_War) in 1801.

Despite two wars with European Powers—the [War of 1812](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_1812) and the [Spanish–American War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish%E2%80%93American_War) in 1898—American foreign policy was mostly peaceful and marked by steady expansion of its foreign trade during the 19th century. The [Louisiana Purchase](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louisiana_Purchase) in 1803 doubled the nation's geographical area; [Spain ceded](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adams%E2%80%93On%C3%ADs_Treaty) the territory of [Florida](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida) in 1819; annexation brought in the independent Texas Republic in 1845; a [war with Mexico](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexican%E2%80%93American_War) added California, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and New Mexico in 1848. The U.S. [bought Alaska](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_Purchase) from the Russian Empire in 1867, and it annexed the independent [Republic of Hawaii](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Hawaii) in 1898. Victory over Spain in 1898 brought the [Philippines](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines) and [Puerto Rico](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puerto_Rico), as well as oversight of Cuba. The short experiment in imperialism ended by 1908, as the U.S. turned its attention to the Panama Canal and the stabilization of regions to its south, including [Mexico](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mexico).

**THEORISING TRADE AGREEMENTS IN US**

For liberals, FEP is an extension of domestic political processes. In a pluralist society, economic actors have defined interests that they seek to see reflected in the making of economic policy, including trade agreements. Interest groups lobby Congress and the executive branch to tailor economic policy to their specific interests and needs within a competitive political system, through exploitation of “veto points” in the polity. Those sectors of the economy that favour liberalisation will generally support the completion of FTAs, and those in favour of protectionism will tend to oppose such agreements. On balance, however, liberals assume that the main impetus for FTAs are the interests of domestic lobbies (i.e., business elites) and that American policymakers will be sympathetic to business interests. In the words of Michael Froman, the second Obama administration’s US Trade Representative, when evaluating new trade agreements, the US “must first and foremost evaluate their economic merits. Trade deals must promote U.S. economic growth, support jobs, and strengthen the middle class”.

**REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

Pradhan, Prakash J. (2003), "The rise of the service sector is a direct foreign investment in the Indian economy: styles, patterns, and shortcuts" reviewed recent trends and patterns and efforts to target decisions on these investments. Compared to the eighties, the movement of the OFDI services sector has undergone many changes. In the seventies it was mainly led by firms from hotels and restaurants, finance and marketing and focused on the developing regions in large numbers and most of them are small. In contrast, during the nineties it was dominated by the software industry of the service sector, a developed region in a region with many businesses.

### Sharma K. (2000), "EXPORT GROWTH IN INDIA: HAS FDI PLAYED

**A ROLE?"** Export supply is positively related to the domestic relative price of exports and higher domestic demand reduces export supply. Foreign investment appears to have statistically no significant impact on export performance although the coefficient of FDI has a positive sign.

### Frank B., John B. (1997), "FDI AND TRADE: THE IRISH HOST-

**Country experience"**, this study is based on the performance of Ireland, the foreign sector makes up one part of the work and the results are almost 60%. FDI changes and FDI effects on growth decisions in Ireland. As well as strong international investment.

**Kumar N. (1995), "Changing the Status of Foreign Direct Investment: Research from Asia"** highlighted another aspect of global economic growth in the past. to strengthen their competitiveness. The threat of market loss in developed countries due to increased security after the formation of regional unions has been addressed by making money for trade and strategic assets demanded by major markets. The practice of exporting more products to the new industrial economy in developing countries is causing developing countries to increase exports.

**Blomstorm M., Koko A. (2003), "Economics of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives"** states that the use of investment incentives focuses exclusively on foreign firms, and to promote other cases from a theoretical point of view, often not a good way to promote national welfare. The main reason is that the most important reason for funding the introduction of FDI spillovers in foreign technology and skills in the domestic industry is not the direct effects of foreign investment.

**Blomstorm M., Koko A. (2003), "Human Capital and Inward FDI"** This study is designed to assess the quality of skills provided by FDI, and how training institutions, business schools, for example, can support FDI-based training and firms.

**Bhaumik S. K. (2003), "FDI Research in India",** this research work examines the relationship between emerging market institutions and entry strategies selected by foreign investors. The suitability of various strategies from the perspective of investors and the impact on the current economy is being investigated. To date, FDI strategies are being investigated and compared to four key emerging markets in India, Egypt, South Africa and Vietnam.

**Kathuria V. (2002), "Liberalization, FDI, and productivity spillovers-an analysis of Indian manufacturing firms"** The results show that after independence, the production of Indian industries, especially overseas firms, had improved. Economic results suggest that only 'science' non-FDI firms have benefited from freedom. In ‘non-scientific’ firms, impact is found as a depressing product. As for spillovers, it can only benefit those local firms, who invest in R&D in recovering spilled data.

**INDIA’S DILEMMA ON REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS**

Involving members of ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand, in addition to India, the Comprehensive Regional Partnership Agreement (RCEP) is expected to become the world's largest free trade agreement. With a combined GDP of US $ 49.5 trillion, approximately 39% of global GDP, RCEP will cover approximately 3.4 billion people [2]. There are significant issues remaining in India until the latest summit in Thailand between 2-4 November 2019. India is negotiating with RCEP and announcing its intention to withdraw from the talks if its concerns are not addressed satisfactorily[[4]](#footnote-5). Koje. In a statement issued by the RCEP joint leaders on 4 November 2019, it was stated that all participating countries will work together to resolve the remaining issues in India in an acceptable manner. India's final decision to register or otherwise in the RCEP agreement will depend on the outcome of current negotiations with other participating countries.

While joining the RCEP is expected to help lower the spaghetti bowl of free trade agreements India has signed with various Asian countries, this agreement has its drawbacks. India is currently facing a $ 104 billion trade deficit and 10 out of 10 RCEPs. The country is deeply concerned about the competition that will be brought by products from China when the agreement is signed. Appropriate emergency prevention measures to prevent import damage are needed but this will still be part of the RCEP framework. India’s comparative advantage lies in correcting the failure of the commodity trade by equating it with the trade in services. However, many developed RCEP countries where India could export services, were unwilling to negotiate broader sectors in activities that could create access to new commercial markets in the region.

**A UNIQUE TIME TO REDO THE TRADE POLICY**

The current regional and provincial power creates a strong economic and systemic issue in which India focuses on its trade and resilience policy, keeping in mind Indian and industrial investment policies. India should also use that time to withdraw from RCEP negotiations to carefully examine the lessons learned from the existing free trade agreements.

The Indian government is already taking practical steps. To address the decline in private equity, corporate taxes have recently been reduced. The new WTO Export, Exemptions or Export Tax Export (RoDTEP) program has been announced by the Indian Finance Minister, who is expected to replace the export promotion program that has been declared a major issue by the WTO panel. Given the complexity of the applicable WTO rules, there is a need to provide the same level of funding as provided in the current plans. To demonstrate compliance with WTO rules, it is important for the government to carefully consider the available information in order to implement this plan. In doing so, it is also important that the various sectors of the sector help to provide certain information / features in their sector to government.

Similarly, the decision of the WTO panel allows India to reconsider its development and trade efforts, such as using special economic zones, to meet its development goals. Frequent inclusion from businesses and other stakeholders, as well as formal partnerships with various local regulators could help India strengthen its negotiating environment and revitalize its trade policy into a 2.0 version that will take into account current economic conditions.

**KEY RELATIONSHIPS**

One can better understand India's trajectory by looking at it from the perspective of four key partners: the United States, China, South Asia and the UNSC, respectively.

**INDIA AND THE UNITED STATE**

Opposition in India - U.S. Relations Prior to 1991 it was still one of the longest running puzzles in American and Indian politics, making him a U.S. strategist. to describe these countries as "anti-democratic" at this time (Kux, 1992). In fact, in the paper, both countries had good reason to be friends and allies when India gained independence in 1947. In addition to being constitutional democracy and having the same views on conflict and freedom in international affairs, the US and India have both been interested in equal power in China and Asia - the United States seeks to increase Communist power in East Asia, while India remains vigilant. . . . it is large and powerful. However, India's foreign policy of non-alignment, which strongly opposed unity and supremacy during the Cold War, was inconsistent with American anti-communist policy. As a result, the relationship was “characterized by disappointment on the Indian side and suspicions on the part of Washington” (Dixit, 2003, p. 44). The idea of ​​segregation was developed by the American and Pakistani alliances, which began in the 1950s and are still in operation today (although they have changed dramatically in recent years). However, when China invaded India in 1962, the U.S. immediately provided military assistance to the government of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. However, in 1971, when the US assisted Pakistan against India in East Pakistan, India abandoned its policy of non-alignment and signed a defense agreement with the Soviet Union, a development also influenced by socialist tendencies in India's first leaders, particularly Nehru. . . . . . . . The Soviet Union also used its voting power at the UNSC to block three resolutions that denied India's participation in what became known as Bangladesh. From here until the end of the Cold War, India and the U.S. They will find themselves in the midst of many problems, from the Indian nuclear program to the invasion of Soviet Afghanistan in the 1980's.

Indo-U.S. Divisions began to wane with the end of the Cold War, as both countries experienced some difficulties. As India recovers from the economic crisis and the government collapses in rapid succession, the US for its part has lost focus on South Asia (the end of the war of Afghanistan's strongest lawyers) and focused on recognizing its existence and its impact on the world. From a government perspective, however, the private sector of both countries began to build stronger ties mainly due to India's massive program of economic liberation and opportunities it offers American businesses. Between 1991 and 2006, trade between the two countries increased sixfold to US $ 32 billion, prompting one US official to say that “significant progress in US-India relations began in the private sector” (Burns, 2007 ).

As the Indian economy grew rapidly, Indian policymakers had the courage to pursue their nuclear program, which was kept until then cold due to fears of US economic sanctions (see Perkovich, 2000). In 1998, the second round of nuclear tests in India (after 1974) re-created American and national attention in South Asia and forced a rethink of U.S. policy. While former American politicians like to look at the entire South Asian region - cunningly, India and Pakistan - new conflicts erupted due to strong ties between the two countries and India as a strategic partner who did not threaten American interests and was actually useful (Cohen, 1998). India, for its part, gradually abandoned its traditional racism in the West and began to align with the U.S., which was the only sport in the city and an important source of investment and trade for India’s growing economy. The victory came shortly after President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed the Indo-U.S. outline. strategic cooperation in July 2005. Most importantly, this agreement paved the way for what became known as the Indo-U.S. The Nuclear Deal, depending on how India will be liberated from the diplo-matic phase where it was thrown in its first nuclear test in 1974. The final agreement, concluded in 2008, allowed India to resume nuclear weapons cooperation with the US and other countries and in particular the nuclear deal which many say could indirectly benefit India's nuclear program. With the emergence of nuclear and security issues aside, the agreement points to significant developments in India-US relations, which have benefited greatly from India's relations with its neighbors - particularly Pakistan and China.

Each common concept in international relations has its own animal ideas, for example neo-realism is linked to the ‘security problem’; 4 neo constructivism is linked to ‘co-ownership’; by the power of ‘full profit’ . Although such conceptual tools are important, they also tend to emphasize that there are emerging differences between domains of domestic and international analysis. As a result, foreign policy analysis falls into two categories - negative as international relations or content that should be classified as public policy or domestic policy.

The question to begin with is whether India's foreign policy is better defined by domestic diversity than foreign policy. Given the neo-realist construction, the construction method, India has failed to operate with emerging power and energy. Moreover, in the past India has been badly portrayed (which led to a border dispute with China in 1962), or has shown unusual weakness in influencing the region. While this article does not specifically address the place where India is a natural person and where foreign actors have a history of interfering in regional affairs, the argument is that domestic factors play a major role in shaping the policy limits of Indian viewers. We say in this article that, operating under great pressure, India's foreign policy seems to be shifting between persuasion and harassment, rather than shifting to ensuring national interest. Yes, in some cases this statement follows the grief and stubbornness of some ministers, but in short, official doctrine remains confusing, inconsistent, and inconsistent.

In our analysis, we use the toolbox; external policy options taken and domestic barriers where selection between policy options will be made in Robert Putnam's 'two-level game', as a tool to define communication

Within the framework of 'our tools', a country manager or foreign policy maker is considered to be in charge of two different levels at the same time. At home, they should consider the interests and needs of the home; and in other countries, he has to deal with his international parts at the negotiating table. ‘Coordination’ in the formulation of foreign policy includes ‘national interests’, or under that rubric as identified by senior analysts; standards governing foreign policy officials; and most importantly, the personality of the decision-makers nationally. Putnam describes two common games as follows:

At the national level, local parties strive to achieve their goals by pressuring the government to adopt acceptable policies, and politicians seek power by building solidarity between these parties. At the international level, national governments seek to increase their capacity to meet domestic pressures, while minimizing the negative effects of foreign development. None of these two games are unknown to middle-aged decision makers.

As a result, the state is no longer the first coalition to be considered by many, and the creation of “national interests '' in it depends not only on international programs and powers, but also on negotiations and domestic activities.

That this model is not as esoteric and as far removed from reality as one might think can be seen, for example, in a comic book published in India Today, October 2, 2000, when a cartoonist took this idea seriously under pressure from Prime Minister Vajpayee. 9 reported internationally as a confirmation of the warmth of Indo-US relations, the reception received by Vajpayee at home was not good at all. The cartoon depicts the uncontrollable coalition Vajpayee who was leading at the time, including among them a strong Hindu nationalist group, Shiv Sena, and a powerful South Indian regional party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). The result of trying to incorporate all these different interests, all of which had different barriers to Indian relations, was the level of insecurity embedded in foreign policy doctrine, although the nature of the Baritya Janata Party, of which Vajpayee was its leader.

To create a two-dimensional test hypothesis for games, this article uses logical selection theory. The central framework, as mentioned above, is that a country needs an entire national agreement based on its original interests in the production of foreign policy, purpose and placement of interdependent instruments. Helen Milner in her 1997 book Interests, Institutions and Information, identifies these three elements as her key elements in policy making. As you put it, in the domestic arena the game is based on the 'differences between the preferences of player policies, the dissemination of information in the country, and the nature of local political institutions'. 10 In this article, it is suggested that the legacy of the liberation struggle and Gandhi's non-violent program, the long-awaited ANC hearing strengthened the aura surrounding Nehruvia's foreign state

policy and internal pressure for nation building, hold the integration of interests, institutions and knowledge into Indian domestic politics equally. With the emergence of the Baritya Janata Party (BJP) —a popular Hindu nation in Indian politics - as a national rival, and the political tendency for unity, the nature of the domestic game changed fundamentally, making India react differently to young people in the Cold War and later.

However, as the following analysis will show, all three factors - interests, information and institutions - appear to be in a state of flux, thus delaying the emergence of a stable foreign policy, and creating a clear and transparent foreign policy in India. To illustrate this, the formation of domestic favor in the four states of nuclearisation, Kashmir, terrorism and the Indian state of South Asia is briefly examined[[5]](#footnote-6).

**CORNERSTONES OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

**THE INDIAN BOMB: THE NUCLEAR QUANDRY**

The nuclear test in 1998 officially landed India in the atomic energy league. However, India's membership of a five-party club - the USA, China, France, the UK and Russia - which is their full nuclear position and the availability of authorized goods is guaranteed by agreements and sanctions, is still strongly opposed. The signing of the ‘Henry Hyde United States - India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act’, dated 18 December 2006, allowed for the integration of American and Indian nuclear weapons, and represented the end of a year and a half of operation. There are three major steps left before the agreement can be finalized. India and the United States must negotiate a two-state agreement that needs to be fully ratified by the US Congress. In addition, India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must agree on a defense agreement, and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which regulates the nuclear trade, must change its rules to allow its members to build nuclear weapons. . . . . weapons. cooperation with India. The impetus for this process is a proposal to extend India's full nuclear status, which has not yet signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(NPT), will encourage others with similar interests, such as Iran, to acquire nuclear weapons, and as a result will jeopardize global security. Opposition to Shyy Saran, India's former foreign secretary in 1998, to include India in a nuclear club, suggests that the country's non-distributional government will work better with ‘India within the tent’. Why is India at risk of foreign sanctions and sanctions? Is India deliberately keeping cool (incomprehensible and incomprehensible) of its real nuclear purpose?

Following the liberation of the British colonial government in 1947, India sought to follow an independent foreign policy aimed at law enforcement, arms embargoes and surrender to international organizations. However, attempts to formulate foreign policy with greater certainty than performance did not show resilience or efficiency. The 1962 border war with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan emphasized the need to prepare for war.

The atomic system in India was started back in 1948 by a renowned nuclear scientist, Homi J. Bhabha. In 1948 the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established, and in 1956 and 1960, the first two nuclear reactors were launched. Despite the 1964 atomic bomb tests in China and India in the arms embargo, it was only in 1974 that nuclear weapons were tested. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who rode the 1971 victory in the Indo-Pakistan war and won the parliamentary and parliamentary elections, called the 1974 election a 'peaceful explosion'. Throughout the 1970s and mid-1980s India's nuclear situation was another 'obstacle', meaning that unused weapons could not be produced immediately, but the nuclear situation in that country was limited.

The fact that India waited until 1998 to test the bomb can be attributed to two factors. First, the benefits associated with the test were unclear. While India came out on top in its nuclear power it was expected that Pakistan would follow, and that nuclear Pakistan, especially with the help of China, would reduce the Indian profits with conventional weapons. The second factor was the pressure, from 1996 onwards, to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (CTBT) and to provide permanent testing and entry into the nuclear club. Indian legislatures are aware of the dangers and have successfully called on the National Democratic Alliance, the Hindu Baratiya Janata Party (BJP), to investigate.

While the proliferation of nuclear weapons seems to have been approved by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the late 1980s, when his plan to end the Holocaust was less severe in the West, the 1998 warranty, adopted by the BJP, led to 'Hinduism' bombings. However, this view is contradicted by the fact that the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) left wing Congress, which replaced the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance-led government in 2004, continues to defend the closure of the nuclearis as an important part of India. economic, defense and foreign policy.

Aside from the well-received complaints in recent Indian and American negotiations on nuclear cooperation, the 13th implementation of a public-private partnership agreement does not require formal action by the Indian parliament. The Communist Party's alliance with the UPA has strongly opposed the agreement and its close ties with the Indo-US, but they have no desire to overthrow the government of which they are a part. The BJP, which is opposed to it, has also been criticized, but this is considered politically motivated and powerless, given that the initial Indo-US arms embargo was introduced under the BJP government in 2004. It is a scientific community, which makes it inconsistent with the need to write in US law India’s voluntary decision to suspend a nuclear test ban. In addition, scientists are questioning whether the US can be trusted as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and information. In the US, protests have allayed fears of regional nuclear power conflicts, or weapons of mass destruction finding their way into the hands of state actors. The controversy last week raised the question of whether India could deliberately transform nuclear facilities into a military base, or add additional military bases, return to current bases for future exploration or hide violent military violence under its research and development program. Can India be trusted to protect territories from terrorism? The IAEA protects countries with non-nuclear weapons, including all nuclear facilities, including research and development institutions. The controversy was particularly intense on the issue institutions will be under the IAEA.

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, who appeared before key Senate and House committees in 2006, sought a nuclear deal with India for three common reasons. First, India's authorization strategy did not prevent India from being wiped out by nuclearisation but only worked to divide the country. He pointed out that the government's energy program, in addition to boosting business opportunities in the United States, "will further international security". The nuclear deal with India will "succeed", meaning "Americans, Indians and the international community" In this regard, Secretary of State Rice stressed that the nuclear deal with India will not lead to a competitive war with South Asia. India was sponsored by Britain, France, Russia and the head of the IAEA and the two-state agreement could be included in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act as amended, without violating a law that does not provide books and air. Finally, he reiterated that India's record of non-proliferation was innocent and that it was ‘unacceptable to compare India with North Korea or Iran’.

**THE KASHMIR CONFLICT: INDIA, HAMSTRUNG**

Although the conflict is currently at a reduced level compared to the previous one, India is still at war in Kashmir. It is a war of attrition, which India cannot win and Pakistan cannot afford to lose. The decision of all parties in the Indian parliament, voted unanimously by Lok Sabha in 1995, confirmed Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian subcontinent and as an internal Indian problem. Any departure from that, which could be regarded as India ‘as permitting further demands in Kashmir’, would thus have limits to opportunistic political parties or for specific purposes. The ‘Peace Agreement’ in Kashmir, under these circumstances, is difficult to explain; and Israel's knowledge of this is not very encouraging. In addition, India is in danger of ‘setting a bad example’ without continuing to move, especially in the northeast of the country.

The Kashmir issue has long been a major concern for Indian and Pakistani projects to build the country and form a government. In India, Jammu and Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim but very Muslim country, are an important pillar of the Indian subcontinent. Guessing the importance of regional strategies in terms of natural resources and national security. In Pakistan, Kashmir should be part of an independent Muslim country in South Asia. As a result, both countries have fought three wars (1947-48, 1965 and 1999).

**METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS**

The current research is based on secondary data which means that data should be collected from various authentic sources and from various sources such as the Department of Trade, Indian Government, Trade Development Association of India, New Delhi,

FI.C.C.I New Delhi. After data collection on all transactions between India and the USA, there will be three phases, namely first, second and higher education. per year wisely during study.

The various goods will be taken in an export basket to the USA and India and shipped to each other at random. Data can also be collected in large mode through the interaction of various working components imported into India.

The main idea of ​​the current study is:

Exports to India are undoubtedly growing, but growing rapidly, especially in the U.S.

If we add or launch more EPZs in India like Santa Cruz, Falta etc in each part of the country than speeding up Indian exports. If we use high technology especially in the production of basic goods there is a big basket to export our goods.Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) are also important energy centers that definitely promise to boost exports.

After the economic revolution in 1991 there is a need to review the Indian economy which will help to grow the Indian economy and its exports.

## OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Like a typical Indian-US relationship. They followed the zigzag proposal during the first fifty years in India shortly after India's independence (1947- 1997), so they were also called unfriendly friends. But in 1991 when India adopted U.S. patents This trade and the global economy enjoys that and makes every effort to provide financial assistance to India by the World Bank, IMF etc. When the U.S. confirms that India is one of the fastest growing economies in the world and is the third most populous nation in the world

The USA did not want to miss the opportunity to get to know India and agreed to trade between the two countries and India and a $ 4 million trade agreement was reached in 1995 and negotiations were ongoing regarding daily trade of about $ 16 billion. 30 billion.

The main objectives of the current study are:

1. An analysis of international trade ideas and the role of these ideas in promoting international trade from ancient times to the present.

2. Planning the similarities and differences between the Indian economies and

USA and potential attempt to overcome inflation in India.

3. Determining the impact of Indian and U.S. trade patterns.

4. Resolve the issues that cause the decline in the rise in exports from India to the U.S.A.

5. Analysis and Interpretation of Foreign Trade Policies in India and the U.S.A.

## LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

While much remains to be done, this study highlights significant findings regarding the conditions of India - U.S.A. during a policy change from 2001 a limited period of eleven years by taking a standard sample of goods for sale.

Any how the current study produced the first findings; its design is flawless. Many warnings need to be observed in relation to the current study.

The main limitations of the study are as follows:

- The study time is so short that we can only look at the two results of policy analysis that keep track of the various options between the two countries during the different study years.

- Trade policies developed between 1997 - 2002 and 2002 - 07, abolished by the 2004 Central Government and revised as 2004-2009 policy. All of this is likely to protect the overall and accurate research results.

The study analyzed not only the economic assumptions that might have been incorrect, but also the fact that it would not have been possible for all the factors and ages to be the same as the existing studies. The study focused only on the announced trade policies of 1997-02, 2002-07, 2004-09 and then 2009-14 and the latest trade policies affecting business organizations in India and the USA, but large and small policies stood for a long time and were unread.

**CONCLUSION**

It is seen through the lens of important relations - with the United States, China, South Asia, and the UNSC - India's foreign policy has changed dramatically as its power has increased in international affairs. While the pursuit of orderly independence remains an important goal, the integration of India's foreign policy has undergone major changes and is more focused on economic connectivity today than ever before. At the same time, India's domestic politics is divided, allowing smaller parties and parties to determine foreign policy appropriately. While political divisions are a sign of India's greater democratic participation, it has a profound effect on India's stability and expectations in its relations with the country.

Eventually, India's approach to global organization has changed over time. India today is very law-abiding and law-abiding, and instead seeks to regulate international trade in ways that suit its interests, be it to open a new Indian trade market, promote sovereignty and stability in international affairs, reconnect with international nuclear markets, or address domestic security standards. and the region. . While its efforts may not always bear fruit, their success and the degree of India's involvement with the international order will depend on how its order and power can reflect India's growing power and influence.

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The OGL was reintroduced in 1976 when it only listed 79 products. By 1988 it already included 1,170 capital goods and 949 intermediate goods (Panagariya, 2004).

By contrast, the share of exports had actually declined from 2.2 per cent to 0.5 per cent between 1948 and 1985 (WTO, 2001)

The concept of the ‘structure of domestic preferences’is borrowed from Milner, *Interests*, 16

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2. Athwal, A (2008). China–India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics. New York: Routledge. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The OGL was reintroduced in 1976 when it only listed 79 products. By 1988 it already included 1,170 capital goods and 949 intermediate goods (Panagariya, 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. By contrast, the share of exports had actually declined from 2.2 per cent to 0.5 per cent between 1948 and 1985 (WTO, 2001) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. The concept of the ‘structure of domestic preferences’is borrowed from Milner, *Interests*, 16 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)